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Executive Summary: Nuclear Stability in North Korea and Russia
On January 12th, the Naval War College convened a group of nuclear stability and regional experts in
Newport, Rhode Island for an unclassified discussion of the incentives U.S. adversaries might have for
nuclear first use. Our aim was to identify the most probable and most dangerous pathways as well as the
impetus for nuclear use. Based on these pathways, we generated a series of policy recommendations for
the U.S. national security community and the U.S. Navy.
North Korea Pathways to Nuclear First Use
- High likelihood of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula after U.S./ROK attack.
- Most likely: High-intensity war that develops from tit-for-tat crisis escalation (expect
nuclear use against U.S./ROK conventional forces).
- Second most likely: First use in response to U.S. or ROK preemptive strike against
regime (most dangerous), nuclear arsenal, or conventional target (least dangerous).
- Low likelihood of North Korean nuclear first use without U.S. or ROK attack.
- Most possible: Paranoia/fear convinces Kim regime of imminent U.S./ROK attack.
- Possible: Kim uses nuclear demonstration in the case of domestic regime collapse.
- Least likely: Proliferation of nuclear weapons to proxy or terrorist organizations to
conduct attacks.
- General Policy Recommendations:
- Strongly recommend no strikes against North Korea.
- Keep nuclear counterforce operations/capability development clandestine.
- Navy Recommendations:
- Prioritize clandestine development of counterforce options for Phase 1 of major war.
- Focus peacetime operational efforts on ballistic missile defense and early warning (less
on posturing with conventional strike platforms).
Russia Pathways to Nuclear First Use
- Low likelihood of Russian nuclear first use
- Most possible: Conventional conflict that threatens Russia’s nuclear force, territorial
integrity, or ability of the state to carry out governance functions.
- Less likely: Non-strategic nuclear weapon use for the purposes of de-escalation.
- General Policy Recommendations:
- Nuclear deterrence is working; develop conventional deterrence options on lower rungs
of the escalation ladder.
- State unequivocally that U.S. and NATO do not seek to alter Russia’s borders, threaten
its nuclear deterrence force, or undermine Moscow’s domestic legitimacy.
- Navy Recommendations:
- Develop a warfighting strategy that focuses on denying Russia its strategic and
operational objectives at the point of attack, and on limited horizontal escalation away
from the Russian mainland.
- Develop a warfighting strategy that reduces Russia’s ability to target U.S./NATO forces,
contains Russian naval forces in their bastions, and eschews engagements inside those
bastions.
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Introduction
On January 12th, the Naval War College convened a group of nuclear stability and regional
experts in Newport, Rhode Island for an unclassified discussion of incentives U.S. adversaries
might have for nuclear first use. The group discussed general pathways to nuclear first use as
well as pathways to North Korean and Russian nuclear first use. Our aim was to identify the
most probable and most dangerous pathways as well as the impetus for nuclear use. Are there
patterns of crises, U.S. behavior, adversary actions, or domestic incentives that make nuclear first
use more likely? Based on the answer to these questions, we generated a series of policy
recommendations for the U.S. national security community and the U.S. Navy.
I. General Pathways to Nuclear First Use:
What qualifies as “nuclear use” will likely be a highly contextual and contested event. We
conceptualized events that could potentially be viewed or presented as nuclear use as falling
along two axes – according to the action’s deliberateness and destructiveness, respectively – and
assessed that only those scoring high on each variable would unambiguously be viewed as
nuclear use. Beyond this narrow subset, how specific events are interpreted will likely vary
widely depending on both the specific actors involved and the circumstances of the event,
including its timing (peacetime/crisis/wartime) and location (on actor’s own territory/at sea/ on
target’s territory).
At the broadest level, we divided pathways to nuclear use into two categories: instrumental and
non-instrumental uses. Instrumental uses include all those in which the potential case of nuclear
use is the result of a calculated effort on the actor’s part to achieve objectives. There are a
number of instrumental pathways to nuclear use, each with its own logic:
Preventive use would occur in peacetime – the oft-mentioned “bolt from the blue” – and
would be designed to reduce the target state’s capabilities in advance of some expected future
conflict;
Preemptive use would occur during a crisis or in a war that had not yet escalated to the
nuclear level and would be intended to blunt an imminent attack;
Inadvertent use is a particular subset of preemption, occurring during a conflict that
threatens the actor’s nuclear forces, delivery systems, and/or command and control, and would
be an effort to achieve some value from one’s own nuclear forces while doing so was still
possible; and
Coercive use would occur during a crisis or war and would be designed to convince the
other side either not to strike in the first place (deterrent use) or to halt an ongoing attack
(compellent use). While nuclear weapons would more likely be used coercively against external
threats, these pathways are also available as means of dealing with potential internal threats.
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Non-instrumental uses include all those in which the potential nuclear event is not driven by
goal-oriented decision making. There are a number of non-instrumental pathways to nuclear use,
each of which could occur at any time and each with its own origins:
Unauthorized use would be initiated either by official personnel acting contrary to orders
or by non-official personnel who had obtained access to nuclear material, whether through theft,
seizure, or sale;
Accidental use would be the result of human error, technological malfunction, or natural
disaster; and
Emotional use would be the result of human decision driven not by strategic calculation
but by feelings of fear, honor, anger, etc.
This discussion has several implications for U.S. strategy and policy. Policymakers should
develop a hierarchy or other conceptualization of different types of nuclear use or related events
to facilitate planning. U.S. actions – particularly military, though across the full range of
instruments of national power – can influence the likelihood of adversaries choosing an
instrumental pathway to nuclear use or finding themselves on a non-instrumental pathway.
Accordingly, policymakers should ensure coordination and control to minimize the chances of
our adversaries ending up on either type of pathway. We judged instrumental pathways more
likely to lead to nuclear use than non-instrumental and, within the former, we judged inadvertent
and coercive uses in the face of U.S. threats or conventional operations most likely. The Navy
should include an evaluation of the escalatory potential of any action in its planning process.
II. North Korea Nuclear First Use:
Perhaps the most important finding from the day’s discussion is that we found almost no
pathway to limited, non-nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. There are compelling
instrumental and non-instrumental incentives for North Korea to use nuclear weapons in crisis
and war. Just as importantly, we also found almost no pathways to North Korean nuclear first
use without external impetus. In other words, we found no status quo incentives for North Korea
to use nuclear weapons preemptively to reunify the peninsula or to coerce objectives from the
U.S. or South Korea. However, we found an extraordinary amount of incentives for North Korea
to use nuclear weapons after almost any kind of limited attack or wartime scenario.
Instrumental Pathways to North Korean Nuclear First Use
The most likely pathway to North Korean nuclear use is a high-intensity war that develops from
tit-for-tat crisis escalation. Because of the extraordinary conventional and nuclear asymmetry
between North Korea and the U.S./South Korea, North Korea must use nuclear attacks early in
the conflict if they have any hope of defeating a U.S. or South Korean offensive. We expected
that the most likely nuclear use for North Korea in this major war type of scenario would be a
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large scale concerted campaign of either counterforce nuclear attacks against U.S./South Korean
staging areas, headquarters, or bases or countervalue nuclear attacks against U.S. cities, U.S.
bases in Japan, or (least likely) South Korean cities. We expected this nuclear attack to occur
very early in the fight.
The second most likely instrumental pathway to North Korean nuclear first use would be in
response to a U.S. preemptive strike against the regime (most dangerous), nuclear/strategic
arsenal, or conventional target (least dangerous). While we believed strikes against the regime
would be the most likely to lead to a nuclear response, we believed that all of these targets had a
high probability of leading to North Korean nuclear first use. The type of nuclear first use would
be tied to how North Korea answered the following questions about the attack:
-

Does North Korea think that the strike is the edge of limited war (i.e. not the
beginning of a larger war to replace the regime or reunify the peninsula)?
Does North Korea think that they can take this strike and sustain their
regime or their conventional/nuclear ability to defeat the U.S.?

We were pessimistic that any type of strikes could effectively signal limited war even against a
rational Kim Jong Un (and were much more pessimistic that an irrational and paranoid Kim Jong
Un would believe a U.S. message of limited war). We were even more pessimistic about North
Korean beliefs that they could withstand a strike and persevere (this goes back to the
conventional asymmetry and is also exacerbated by an irrational paranoia). We believed that,
based on our assessment of how the North Koreans might perceive the answers to the questions,
nuclear first use was most likely to be against U.S. bases in the Pacific, potentially against the
U.S. homeland, and finally (least likely) some kind of nuclear demonstration in international
waters or airspace. We spent some time discussing if there were any types of U.S. or South
Korean attacks that would be least likely to lead to a North Korean nuclear response and believed
that cyber would be the potentially least dangerous. This was partly because of the lack of
potential effectiveness but also because the ambiguity of the attack vector could create time and
uncertainty that buffers attack responses.
Non-Instrumental Pathways to North Korean Nuclear First Use
We found few internal impetuses for nuclear first use and were highly pessimistic that North
Korea would use nuclear attacks in an unprovoked bid to reunify the peninsula. Because of the
extraordinary conventional asymmetry posed by the U.S. and South as well as sixty years of
successful deterrence, we believed that North Korea would have to be unprecedentedly irrational
to use nuclear weapons offensively. What then would be the irrational pathways to nuclear first
use? We assessed that the greatest psychological impetus for irrational use of offensive nuclear
weapons would be if paranoia and fear convinced the Kim regime that they were on the verge of
imminent attack and therefore launched a preemptive nuclear attack. According to this logic, the
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more fear the U.S. and South Korea create about a potential strike, the more likely Kim Jong Un
is to use nuclear weapons preemptively. This is a heightened version of what we believed was
the most likely instrumental pathway to war and therefore whether Kim is irrational or rational,
the same incentives for nuclear first use remain.
We also explored domestic incentives for nuclear first use. With limited knowledge of internal
elite politics and nuclear pre-delegation and control within North Korea, we assessed (with low
certainty) that there was a low likelihood of a rogue coup that would lead to nuclear first use.
We did think there was a possibility that the Kim regime would use a nuclear demonstration in
the case of some sort of domestic regime collapse. In the case of a partial collapse, we believed
that the Kim regime may conduct a nuclear demonstration in order to signal willingness to use
and deter other states from intervening in the conflict. Finally, we cannot discount that, if faced
with defeat (either internally or externally), Kim may launch a nuclear attack simply as a final
act of vengeance against his enemies. There is of course always a potential for accidents and
tests gone awry and we assessed that this could lead to the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons—
originally intended for demonstration purposes—to have an impact on U.S. or allied force in the
Pacific.
Finally, the most dangerous potential first use of nuclear weapons stemming from the North
Korean regime would be the proliferation of nuclear weapons to proxy or terrorist organizations
to conduct attacks. While this is potentially the most dangerous non-instrumental pathway to
nuclear first use, there is currently no historical precedent and currently no technological
capability to proliferate a smaller style portable bomb to a proxy to conduct a nuclear terrorist
attack.
General Policy Recommendations
The most important policy implication that comes from this discussion is that there are both
instrumental and non-instrumental, rational and irrational, incentives for North Korean nuclear
first use, and they nearly all come back to the use of force against targets inside North Korea.
Signaling restraint with force is almost impossible with a rational agent and a catalyst for war
with an irrational or paranoid agent. We highly recommend against the use of limited strikes (or
bloody nose attacks) to dissuade North Korea from further developing its nuclear arsenal. We
also recommend that nuclear counterforce operations and nuclear counterforce capability
development should be kept as clandestine as possible. This is an especially tricky dynamic as
too much counterforce capability might convince North Korea that they must conduct a
preemptive nuclear strike in order to survive. Meanwhile, too little counterforce capability
means that North Korea will be more able to conduct nuclear attacks early in a Korean conflict.
Because of these tricky dynamics, we cannot completely advocate against counterforce courses
of action or capability development. However, we do recommend that these efforts remain as
clandestine as possible and not part of an overt signaling strategy targeted at the Kim regime.
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Finally, as the most dangerous option for nuclear first use may come from the proliferation of
capabilities to proxies, we recommend that policy efforts focus on deterrence of nuclear
proliferation to others, not on rolling back the North Korean nuclear program or “bloodying the
nose.”
Navy Specific Recommendations1
The Navy plays an important signaling and counterforce role against the Kim regime, as well as
a highly flexible option for a limited strike against mainland North Korea. Because of these
central roles, the Navy’s operations, capability, and messaging are important elements to
deterring, avoiding, and limiting a North Korean first use of nuclear weapons. First, the Navy
should develop clandestine or covert counterforce options in the case of a major war with North
Korea so as to not heighten paranoia in the Kim regime. The bulk of the Navy efforts in the
initial stages of that war likely should be in the employment of these secretive options. Prior to
large-scale conflict, the Navy should focus its efforts in the region on ballistic missile early
warning and defense. Navy assets—especially aircraft carriers and the Aegis—are visible and
visceral signals of U.S. extraordinary capability. The Navy should use these signals lightly as
they significantly increase fear and paranoia in an irrational North Korea, and highlight
conventional imbalances in a rational North Korea. Both of these pathways are highly dangerous
for North Korean nuclear first use.
III. Russia Nuclear First Use:
Russia continues to emphasize the central role of nuclear forces in its strategic posture.
Nevertheless, the last decade has seen a significant shift away from what might be characterized
as a “hyper-reliance” on nuclear weapons, and toward the use of conventional, long-range,
precision-guided munitions (LRPGM) for strategic effect. We concluded that Moscow has a
high bar for nuclear first use, and that Russia’s pathways to nuclear first use must be understood
in the context of Moscow’s thinking about strategic deterrence and its increasing reliance on
LRPGM.
Instrumental Pathways to Russian Nuclear First Use
Instrumental pathways to Russian first use of nuclear weapons are limited. The most likely
pathway to Russian first use is framed by a conventional conflict in which Russia’s nuclear force
and the ability of the state to carry out governance functions are in critical danger; in short, when
all deterrence and compellence options short of nuclear use have failed. Moscow largely seeks
deterrence of and in conflict through the use of whole-of-government approaches that include
diplomacy, influence and information operations, and the use of conventional LRPGM, as well
as nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Russian nuclear doctrine reserves the right to use nuclear
1

Navy recommendations contained in this paper are for the Navy to consider in the context of joint plans/operations
and in the joint and interagency strategy discussion.
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weapons in response to a nuclear attack, and when the existence of the Russian state (including
the loss of territorial integrity) is in jeopardy. Workshop participants also noted that erosion by
military means of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and nuclear command and control also constitute, in
Moscow’s eyes, grounds for nuclear first use. While some Russian strategists discuss the use of
nuclear weapons in other instrumental ways, the preponderance of evidence indicates that Russia
views nuclear weapons as deterrence, not warfighting tools, and is likely to use nuclear weapons
only in extremis.
While conventional force asymmetries between the U.S. and Russia are significant, we
nevertheless considered non-strategic nuclear weapon use for the purposes of de-escalation to be
less likely, particularly because Moscow has now reached the point where the use of LRPGM
with conventional munitions can have the same strategic effect with significantly less escalatory
risk. The use of tactical nuclear weapons during a conflict cannot be totally dismissed, but
Russian strategic thinking has been very clear about the increased role that conventional
munitions and non-traditional attacks (such as cyber warfare) can play in order to achieve
strategic goals. This trend is likely to continue. Further, there is limited open-source evidence of
Russia operationalizing an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy.
Finally, while domestic political priorities cannot be discounted, workshop participants
concluded that Moscow is unlikely to use nuclear weapons to shore up political support – unless
the Putin regime judged that an impending defeat during conflict would undercut the
government’s legitimacy and create an existential threat via domestic upheaval (through loss of
territorial integrity or other pivotal wartime event).
Non-Instrumental Pathways to Russian Nuclear First Use
Non-instrumental pathways are even more limited. Russian senior political and military
leadership has emerged from a Cold War strategic tradition that prized rational decision-making
about the use and value of nuclear weapons. That intellectual framework continues to hold.
Moscow is also unlikely to choose non-instrumental, irrational options such as a Samson Option
– launching its nuclear weapons in an apocalyptic spasm in response to a conventional attack –
particularly if its own nuclear force, territorial integrity, and ability to govern remain intact.
Policy Recommendations
Nuclear deterrence of Russia is working. Policymakers should continue to note that Moscow is
not suicidal. President Putin and the coterie of leaders around him understand that there is no
guarantee against U.S. escalation if Russia were to engage in a first use of nuclear weapons,
either strategic or non-strategic. Russian nuclear doctrine sets a high bar for nuclear use and also
emphasizes conventional deterrence, which reflects the premium that Moscow now places on
using conventional weapons for strategic effect – something any strategic approach to Russian
nuclear questions should keep in mind. We recommend any policy should state unequivocally
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that the U.S. and NATO do not seek to alter Russia’s borders, nor undermine Moscow’s
domestic legitimacy.
Navy Specific Recommendations
The U.S. Navy can develop strategic and operational approaches along these lines as well.
Because nuclear first use by Moscow is most likely to come in the context of an ongoing
conventional conflict, these recommendations focus more on options during kinetic operations.
Moscow’s conventional capabilities are now able to achieve the same military effect as a tactical
nuclear weapon. What is the difference if Russia destroys a carrier strike group with a single
nuclear weapon or a large volley of conventional missiles? The strategic effect is still the same.
We recommend, therefore, that the Navy develop a strategy that reduces Russia’s ability to target
U.S./NATO forces, contains Russian naval forces in their bastions, and refuses engagements
inside those bastions. Engaging forces inside nuclear bastions appreciably raises the prospect of
Russian nuclear first use. Finally, a strategy that envisions all-out strikes on the Russian
mainland is a losing one, both for its questionable military effect and extraordinary escalation
risk. Instead, a warfighting approach that focuses on defending interests at the point of attack (or
denying Russian military objectives at the operational level of war), rolling back Russian gains
in a politically feasible time frame, and on limited horizontal escalation off of the Russian
mainland can mitigate the risk of Russian first nuclear use.
IV. Conclusion
While the individual pathways to nuclear first use may differ between North Korea and Russia,
in a conflict with the United States, the U.S. way of war may set these nations down a path to
nuclear first use. The U.S. propensity for targeting adversary C2 architectures, decapitation
strikes, and other tactics raises the risk of nuclear response by both nations. In the North Korean
case, the pathways to nuclear first use, both instrumental and non-instrumental, are wide and
varied, and it seems clear that even attempts at limited “bloody nose” strikes may trigger a
disproportionate nuclear response. In the Russian case, those pathways are more limited and
those triggers perhaps less sensitive, but they are arguably more dangerous for the existential
threat they pose globally.
Diplomacy is the obvious response to these challenges prior to major crises or inadvertent
conflict erupts. In the unlikely event of a conflict, however, military solutions to these similar
challenges are much different. While counterforce options should be developed clandestinely,
counter-intuitively, in a conflict against North Korea, a state with a small nuclear arsenal, an
overwhelming conventional strike that destroys Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons as quickly as
possible may be the best kinetic option. Conversely, against Russia, more limited conventional
strikes aimed at denying Moscow the object of its aggression, combined with limited horizontal
escalation, may be more effective at short-circuiting a nuclear response.
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